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n Taiwan, in the early 2010s, the leaders of the Miaoli and Hsinchu districts and the mayor of Taichung -all three affiliated to the Kuomintang (KMT) -drew up a plan for the construction of Hakka tulou (kejia tulou 客家土樓) (1) in each of these areas. Of the three projects, only the Miaoli plan came to fruition: the tulou known as the Hakka Roundhouse (Kejia yuanlou 客家圓樓) was inaugurated on 25 October 2014 in the town of Houlong 後龍. Officially, the aim of these three initiatives was the development of tourism through the valuation of "Hakka culture." (2) From the time they were proposed until their realisation or abandonment, these three projects engendered lively criticism on the part of local residents, the media, and Taiwanese intellectuals. The fiercest polemic centred on the Miaoli tulou. (3) In 2010, the building of the Hakka Roundhouse led to the demolition of two clay structures built by the Hakkas of Taiwan in the early 1950s: the "eight-trigram kiln" (bagua yao 八卦窯) and the "tetragonal kiln" (sifang yao 四方窯). In an interview conducted by Liberty Times in July 2013, Ho Chuan-kun 何傳坤, a Taiwanese anthropologist from the National Tsing Hua University, expressed his disapproval of the destruction of a part of Taiwanese Hakka culture, seeing in it the renunciation of a culture whose foundations were Taiwanese in favour of an imposed Chinese culture that was stripped of meaning and memorial value for the local population and the Hakkas of Taiwan:
The value of historic monuments lies in the place where they have their roots. When the government of the district of Miaoli imitates a tulou, is it to attract Taiwanese tourists or Chinese tourists? Why would Chinese tourists come to Taiwan to visit these mountain fortresses, the tulou? […] If we are not saving the cultural heritage N o . 2 0 1 7 / 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s p e e r -r e v i e w e d a r t i c l e 19 1. Tulou, literally "earth buildings," are a type of architecture unique to southwestern China and were added to the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2008 (in the cultural assets category). Built on stone foundations, with a wooden frame and surrounded by a wall made of hard-packed earth, the tulou -often casually termed "mountain fortresses" on account of their fortified appearance -are often categorised according to their shape and ground plan: the three most common plans are the round tulou (yuanlou), the square tulou (fanglou), and the five-phoenix-style tulou (wufenglou). These buildings are inhabited by the Hakka (Kejia in putonghua) and by the Minnan (also known as Fulao or Hoklo in Taiwan), two sub-groups of the majority Han nationality living mainly in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. However, the heritage rhetoric disseminated by the Chinese government contributed to the crystallisation of a tulou-Hakka correlation that assimilated the tulou into a Hakka cultural and territorial marker, thereby obliterating the involvement of the Minnan population in the building of these edifices. 2. In 2013, on the pretext of developing tourism, the government of Hsinchu, a neighbouring district to Miaoli, officially announced the building of a Tourist Service Centre constructed in the form of a Hakka tulou. Information on the Hsinchu tulou project is available on the official site of the Hsinchu municipal department of civil engineering. Cf. Xinzhu xian zhengfu gongwu chu (Civil engineering department of the Hsinchu district), "Xinzhu xian lüyou fuwu zhongxin kejia tulou xingjian gongcheng weituo guihua jishu fuwu" (Planning department in charge of the construction work on the Hakka tulou, Tourist Service Centre for the district of Hsinchu), https://docs.google.com/file/d/ 0B7DQmv-1pOToY2VKVTNFSjZTN0E/edit (accessed on 22 November 2016). In 2014, it was the turn of Hu Chih-chiang, the mayor (KMT) of the municipality of Taichung, to plan the building of a round tulou in the Hakka quarter of Tungshih, but the project did not come to fruition. 
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From the Event to a Critique of Representative Democracy of the Hakka of Taiwan, could it be because we do not have confidence in our own heritage? (4) On 21 September 2013, the Taiwan Hakka Think Tank (Taiwan Kejia zhiku 台灣客家智庫) organised a press conference to call upon the Head of the Miaoli district, Liu Cheng-hung 劉政鴻, to "immediately stop the building of a Chinese Hakka tulou that has no connection with Taiwan," to broaden his knowledge of Hakka culture, and to enhance the cultural heritage of Miaoli District. (5) Alongside small-scale demonstrations against the destruction of the kilns and the building of a tulou, (6) the protesters exploited the virtual sphere, a privileged forum for the "critical sovereignty of opinion," (7) which was increasingly becoming a zone and a tool for citizen-based surveillance in Taiwan. (8) This exercise of citizen activity in a democratic context (evaluation, judgement, prevention, etc.) is part of the communication society, structured by social media (Facebook, Wechat, Line, etc.), microblogs (Twitter, Weibo), Bulletin Board Systems (PTT), and other virtual interfaces that transmit information and enable dialogue between internet users. (9) These new online communication platforms have led researchers to investigate the observations of internet users in order to have a better understanding of their engagement and of the politico-social dimension. (10) This article analyses certain online controversies (11) concerning the reception of the three tulou building projects through a qualitative survey on new media and through the exchange of comments between internet users published between July 2013 and July 2015. The aim of studying these comments is to reproduce the social mood of a section of the Taiwanese population under the second mandate of President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 (KMT) from May 2012 to May 2016, and at the same time to enable researchers to understand more clearly the censorship role played by internet users, who are often only partially anonymous, and to consider the dynamics of the comments and virtual dialogue of internet users.
Although the question of identity is well and truly present in the online posts, internet users reveal a varied range of concerns that contribute to a common dynamic: the creation of an indictment against the government in power and the elaboration of a common horizon of expectation. Virtually or physically, the players (militants, internet users, and politicians) mobilise in the name of certain values to initiate, stop, or change the direction of a process of reform. This article studies the reception of three tulou construction projects in Taiwan from the perspective of the processual change that led to the realisation or abandonment of the project rather than from the perspective of the result. (12) Empirical materials, choice of corpus, and methodology
Most of the online articles on building tulou in the Miaoli and Hsinchu districts and in the Taichung municipality were published between 2013 and 2015 in the two biggest Taiwanese daily papers, the liberal democratic Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報), in favour of Taiwanese independence, and Apple Daily (Pingguo ribao 蘋果日報), considered to be a moderate daily. (13) Five of the articles are followed by Facebook comments (four in Apple Daily and one in Liberty Times), (14) so a total of 129 Facebook comments were collected. This data base was expanded by 23 Facebook comments posted after an article in the online ETtoday 東森新聞雲, and 15 Facebook comments published on the page of the Taiwanese forum Mesotw (Taiwan xiaozhan 台灣小站), entitled "Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou" (Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan Kejia yao gai Zhongguo tulou 苗栗縣長劉 政鴻 拆台灣客家窯 蓋中國土樓). Moreover, the survey resulted in the collection of 172 other posts on three articles published on one of the main Taiwanese platforms, PTT Bulletin Board System (Pititi shiye fang 批踢踢實 業坊), mainly used by students. In all, a sample of 367 comments from internet users, of variable quality and length, were analysed. It should be pointed out that the pages of the PTT forum and Mesotw are systematically linked to Liberty Times and Apple Daily.
Online, the context is provided by many elements: the subject of the page on which the comment is posted, its place in a virtual dialogue between internet users, the social network used to publish the comment, etc. 11. The term "controversy" is understood here to be an "'effervescent moment' as defined by Durkheim, or in other words, as an occasion for the social players to question certain hitherto established balances of power and beliefs, to redistribute amongst themselves 'greatness' and positions of power, and to invent new organisational systems and techniques that will shape their future relationships differently. 14. Articles published in China Times were not used, since the site blocks comments by internet users.
In the case of the Facebook posts, for example, a survey was conducted on the profile of the internet user in question in order to understand the place of the comment in the news thread. Nonetheless, internet users enjoy partial anonymity, which acts as a definite curb to a comprehensive understanding of the identity of the internet user as a player in the social network. Digital identity also depends as much on the virtual platform (that establishes a normative framework of variable flexibility) as on the internet user. (15) A chronological analysis of the posts revealed two broad time spans, each relating to a specific subject: the comments from 2013 relate mainly to the question of identity, whilst those from 2014 and 2015 reveal a critique of the local political system. These two issues should be placed against the background of a more general consideration of the uncertainties of representative democracy in the Taiwanese context.
(De)legitimising the representation of identities: Authority figure and political fiction
Miaoli District head Liu Cheng-hung announced in a press release in July 2013:
The construction of the tulou represents the local culture of 65% of the Miaoli Hakka and should enable us to attract tourists. We hope that everyone will be able to assimilate the tulou as an integral part of local culture and benefit from this ancestral wisdom. (16) This declaration drew numerous comments from both sympathisers and detractors of Liu Cheng-hung's position, all raising the same question: can the tulou embody the Hakkas of Taiwan? Two major fundamental questions emerged from the analysis of internet users' comments: is the culture and identity of the Taiwanese Hakkas distinct from that of the Chinese Hakkas? Are local officials justified in representing a hypostatised Hakka community? Over and above previous analyses of the lack of consensus between Chinese culture and Taiwanese identity, these issues may be understood in the light of the tension between the construction of a political issue as an abstract political principle relating to a form of totality, or unity ("the People," "the Hakka ethnic group"), (17) and the liberal principle whereby each individualised subject has the right to self-determination. (18) Although a comment is a form of individual expression, its rhetoric is characterised by reference to collective forms of designation, synecdoches that use I as an expression of the collective. (19) By using these collective designations as a screen for the I, the internet user tends to set himself up as an authority figure, the legitimate spokesperson for a community.
Chinese Hakkas vs Taiwanese Hakkas: Aporia of the essentialisation of an identity dualism
Following an article in Apple Daily published on 21 July 2013, entitled "Miaoli district is building a small mountain fortress, a 'Fujian tulou'," an internet user with a higher education diploma, Nan Xiang Chu, distinguished between two Hakka communities (see figure 1):
Is this the culture of the Mainland Hakkas? Or is it the culture of Taiwanese Hakkas? Did [the town of] Kaohsiung, and [the districts of] Miaoli and Hsinchu have this kind of architecture before? Is it right to destroy the square kiln, the octagonal kiln, and other historic monuments? (20) Nan Xiang Chu's questions on the nature of Hakka culture in Taiwan are similar to those of other internet users who raise the issue of the correspondence between the tulou as an element of representation of Taiwanese Hakka culture and the origin of the Hakkas, a diaspora community, whose official history has been structured by several migratory waves in China and the countries of Southeast Asia. (21) Certain internet users therefore associate the geographic origin of the Hakkas with the legitimacy of the tulou in its function as a representation 19. Quoting Jean-Louis Fabiani, Cyril Lemieux notes that in cases of controversy, "it is always a question of creating conditions that allow the protagonist to invoke as witness, or even constitute as a resource, the audience to a debate. This audience may be virtual, represent posterity or the universal: the presupposition of its existence opens up a space for the disclosure of truth.
[…] In this type of conflict, the proviso by which the two adversaries must recognise that each has an equal right to expose their arguments before the public and to present proof tends to be invested by the participants in varying degrees." Cyril Lemieux, "À quoi sert l'analyse des controverses" (What is the purpose of analysing controversies), op. cit., p. 195. Fiorella Bourgeois -The Cyber-reception for Three Hakka Tulou Construction Projects in Taiwan Nevertheless, although the history of the migration of Hakkas to Taiwan remains an authoritative argument put forward by many internet users, the cultural rhetoric that emanates from it is skilfully treated by those who support Taiwanese self-determination regarding their identity, culture, collective memory, and history. Those who believe that there is a cultural difference between a Taiwanese Hakka community and a Mainland Hakka group concede that the Hakkas who immigrated to Taiwan produced a culture that is all their own since they assimilated part of the native culture. (25) The Taiwan Hakka Think Tank therefore affirmed that "the construction of a round tulou goes against the historical process of the Hakkas of Taiwan." (26) In a Facebook comment dated 22 July 2013, a student from the National University of Tainan, Wayne Chen, argues that the ancestors of the Hakkas who immigrated to Taiwan never built tulou, so the tulou cannot embody the Taiwanese Hakka community.
Detractors and zealots approach the historical narrative from two distinct, opposing angles. The first group base their arguments on a retrospective determinist historical path to legitimise the Chinese identity of the Hakkas invoked by the tulou monument. The second group, on the other hand, invoke a prospective determinist historical dynamic by which the historic force that moves Taiwan inevitably leads to the formation of a Hakka culture that has Taiwanese foundations. Therefore, those who oppose the tulou construction project condemn the semiotic dimension of the architecture as part of a politically-imposed narrative that conflicts with a historic process of self-determination unique to Taiwan.
From one collective to another: An attack on Taiwanese sovereignty
In an attempt to discredit the erection of the Miaoli tulou and to reinforce a feeling of "misrepresentation," internet user Tsen Wei Lun quotes the introduction to an article in Liberty Times:
Chen Ban [陳板], ex-president of the Hakka television channel and a guest professor affiliated with the Department of Architecture Art Conservation of the National University of the Arts in Taiwan, strongly criticised Liu Cheng-hung by affirming that he had deceived the Taiwanese people by creating a meaningless style of architecture. (27) This extract sees the "people" as a form of collective interiority with its own character, whose expectations have not been fulfilled. The use of the topic "Taiwanese people" rather than "Hakka" is more evident in the PTT comments than in those of Liberty Times and Apple Daily. On 22 July 2013, an internet user introduced a topic on an article in Liberty Times entitled "Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou." (28) In a series of three comments, internet user Chungrew makes no mention of the Hakkas and concentrates his arguments on the fragile construction of Taiwan as a nation (see figure 2):
Of course this [the destruction of the kilns and building of the tulou] is inappropriate; this type of procedure will destroy traditional Taiwanese culture and damage its history. But if, however, we are convinced that Taiwanese roots are in China, then this sort of thing is fair and right. A nation without roots is a terribly frightening thing. Spe c ial f e atu r e How should we interpret the effort of internet user Chungrew to rationalise the situation? In his view, it is above all a question of a conflict over the interpretation of the "roots of the identity" of the Taiwanese population. Moreover, he does not hesitate to warn against the risks inherent in the indetermination of these roots for the "Taiwanese nation."
Whether it is a question of the defenders of the tulou or of its opponents, the question of the balance between the instituted (the Hakkas and secondly the Taiwanese) and the instituting (the tulou) reveals the tension created by the inclusion of the autonomous individual (the internet user) in a personified affective community ("the Taiwanese" people and "the Hakkas") whose substance has been called into question. This conflict seems unsurpassable in that internet users and the media have not reflected upon the category of "Hakka" as an institutionalised political entity. Moreover, the media have not encouraged the rationalisation of the pluralism underlying this standardising designation.
The "foreigner," between exemplariness and defiance: A critique of inter-Strait cultural exchange policies
On 22 July 2013, Liberty Times published an article entitled "Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou." The article reproduces the dialogue between public intellectuals and members of the government:
The Miaoli government responded to the unsolicited criticism expressed by Wu Yi-chen [PDP and Legislative Yuan member] in the previous day's paper, which accused the government of putting pressure on the culture of Taiwanese Hakkas. She [Wu Yi-chen] had not understood that cultures can be exchanged and combined [ronghe jiaoliu 融合交流] and do not take account of territorial boundaries. They cannot be neatly compartmentalised. Although public figures use this topic as a pretext for satisfying their own objectives, the government of the district will protest strongly and will not give in. (29) Although these official statements would seem to maintain a distinction between the Hakkas of China and the Hakkas of Taiwan, the topic of the exchange and mixing of cultures annoyed many internet users. In a comment published on 22 July 2013 on the Mesotw platform, internet user Kcm quoted the above passage and denounced the cultural exchange policies between China and Taiwan promoted by the Miaoli government as part of the strengthening of inter-Strait Sino-Taiwanese relations in order to justify the construction of the tulou:
[In order to foster] cultural exchanges, must we begin by mutilating our own culture and destroying its heritage? Does the rest of the world behave like this in order to boost tourism? (30) The analogy of the foreigner appears again in a comment from Youzi buyi 游子布衣, who says that the United States and Japan do not repress their history and culture in this way. (31) This comparison is particularly interesting on account of the history of diplomatic relations between the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China. As a result, the two countries mentioned by the internet user have been elevated to the rank of yardstick, or even of an example to be followed in the management of collective memory and national heritage. Similarly, several internet users use the analogy with a foreign country to mock Taiwanese cultural exchange policies and the officials who apply them. In a PTT comment, Bce says mockingly, "If Egypt wanted to destroy the pyramids to build a great wall, saying that it would attract tourists, wouldn't you find that ridiculous?" (32) At the same time, certain internet users developed a rhetoric of the "enemy-foreigner," using an image of China and the local official in which "foreign" is used to describe any entity that is not part of the affective community:
Is he a Chinese spy? He has come specially to destroy Taiwanese culture when it should be transmitted! The construction of the tulou will not turn me into a Mainland Hakka, will it? Could it be that in becoming an official, one becomes an idiot? (33) In this comment, internet user Chen Hongling Against this background of upheaval in which internet users denounced the wrongs of the system of representation, certain comments opened up a horizon of expectation and formulated the prerequisites for the establishment of a fair and moral government attentive to the demands of the population and which would be unable to govern without its consent.
An act of accusation against local officials: Personifying corruption
The internet users took on a censorship role towards the officials they were assessing. As judges, they condemned the acts of these politicians if they did not measure up to an implicit moral and politico-judicial ethic. Liu Cheng-hung, for example, was accused of land speculation. On the Mesotw forum, the internet user NorthStar protested:
Liu Cheng-hung is the biggest bandit in Miaoli. He has taken the people's land by force and destroyed their heritage. He connives with the entrepreneurs who speculate on building land […] . (39) For Chen Dongfu 陳東甫, Liu's aim was to increase land prices in order to gentrify the district in which he lived:
First, Liu Cheng-hung built, next to his home, a high-speed train station. Then he had a bilingual school built. The land next to his home was originally agricultural land. Suddenly, land prices increased and now he is building a tulou there. He is continually developing the place […] . (40) Land speculation incited certain internet users to play on the Chinese character tu 土 meaning here "the earth, the ground, the dust," coupling it with other Chinese characters to create insults. Liu Cheng-hung is called a tufei 土匪, meaning "bandit," from tu bawang 土霸王, a term meaning a "land despot," and tu huangdi 土皇帝, an expression that might be translated as "land emperor" (see figure 3 ):
Liu Cheng-hung is "dust," he has become land emperor in Miaoli, isn't it wonderful? The magazines have elected him "chief of the five-star district." Building an "edifice of earth" for "the land emperor" is the next criteria for becoming chief of a five-star district. (41) Jay Fang, a young man of 35 living in Taipei, called into question the relative credibility of the system for rating districts. Indeed, in 2012, Liu Cheng-hung was designated chief of a five-star district following a "poll measuring the level of satisfaction [of the population] with the officials at the head of the districts and municipalities" (xianshizhang shizheng manyi du da diaocha 縣市長施政滿意度大調查), published annually by the magazine Yuanjian (遠見雜誌). The nomination of Liu was interpreted as an act of complicity between the Miaoli district chief and the media. In his exchange with Jay Fang, Lin Zuguang 林祖光, a young Taiwanese from Kaohsiung and supporter of the Black Island Nation Youth Front (Heise daoguo qingnian zhenxian 黑色島國青年陣線), added, "925,000 NT$ to buy the magazines and get yourself elected chief of a five-star district." (42) Comments, as a form of protest, and more generally, those in the virtual sphere, have come to compensate for a lack of surveillance institutions and consequently, a failing of the democratic government to regulate itself. Therefore, for internet user Chen Hongmou 陳弘謀, if the government is not competent in the exercise of the power bestowed on it, it is up to the sovereign people to make themselves known and defend their rights. (43) The role of the internet user-censors was to reveal abuses in a the system. They associated the demolition of the Hakka kilns in Miaoli in 2013 and the mobilisation solicited by the forced buying by the state of land belonging to the peasant farmers of Zhudong in 2015 for the construction of a tulou, with the destruction set in motion by Liu Cheng-hung. Many internet users reminded their readers that since 2010, Liu had been behind a wave of expulsions and the demolition of homes that had led to several suicides in the village of Dabu 大埔, in the district of Miaoli. Subsequently, the population of the district organised several demonstrations in order to denounce the expropriation of land by the local government. For example, the demands of the big protest movement of 18 August 2013, whose slogan was "Today Dabu has been demolished, tomorrow the government will be destroyed" (Jintian chai Dabu, mingtian chai zhengfu 今天拆大埔, 明天拆政 府), included the revision of the Law on the Expropriation of Land (Tudi zhi shou tiaoli 土地徵收條例). In response to these injustices, several internet users took part in a virtual collective movement that transmitted a form of vengeance that expressed itself in the -virtual -destruction of Liu Chenghung's house. In reaction of the demolition of four homes in Dabu in 2013, internet user Kuso posted on Facebook a photograph in which he staged the destruction of Liu Cheng-hung's house with the help of an animated miniature mechanical digger (see figure 4) . (44) At the same time, several internet users suggested destroying Liu Cheng-hung's home and replacing it with a famous monument. In a comment dated 22 July 2013, internet user Lin Damao 林大毛 suggested:
[…] Why not simply destroy the Chief of Miaoli's house and build a Statue of Liberty? I think that's not a bad idea. (45) A majority of internet users would have liked to see Liu Cheng-hung resign, citing the lack of possible remedies in the face of his prevarications. On the one hand, some accused Liu Cheng-hung of being protected by the government of Ma Ying-jeou (46) and in particular by the Legislative Yuan. (47) On the other hand, the comments remind us that this corrupt politician was elected by the ballot box. As a result, Taiwanese internet users who are not from Miaoli District incriminated the local inhabitants who gave him procedural legitimacy through the local elections just as much as they blamed Liu Cheng-hung himself.
From local elections to the democracy of authorisation
The internet users displayed real disenchantment with an electoral system that no longer legitimises elected officials. Although the election attributes a function to an individual, the authority this confers is only partial in that the governees test the officials during the exercise of their mandate. Although local officials such as Liu Cheng-hung in Miaoli and Chiu Ching-chun in Hsinchu obtained procedural legitimacy through the elections (also called "legitimacy of establishment"), (48) they did not acquire the social legitimacy granted by those they governed. Indeed, the relationship of trust between the governing and the governed is established in the course of the mandate and not through the electoral procedure: (49) In this comment, Alan Hsieh underlines the lack of perspective in the budgetary policies applied in Hsinchu, which he associates with the incompetence of the local officials in administrative matters. As a result, the electoral procedure does not allow "men of talent" and experts to be chosen. Concern over the management of expenses by the local executive branch is frequent in the comments of internet users. The deficit in Miaoli District, an example not to be repeated, is used as an authoritative argument by internet users to rationalise their corresponding rejection of the Hsinchu and Taichung projects.
The internet users expressed their anxiety over the local general elections in November 2014; some of them evoked the possibility of a KMT victory in their locality and thought that the tulou construction projects in Hsinchu and Taichung were a means for the KMT candidates already in office to rally the Hakka electorate, which is well represented in these regions. (50) Moreover, many internet users questioned the reasons that incited the inhabitants of Miaoli to give free rein to Liu Cheng-hung, this "local tyrant" (tuhao 土豪), (51) this thug (liumang 流氓) (52) who "tramples on the people." (53) Indeed, although the civil servant Liu has a supporting social role, the choice of a representative is the responsibility of the citizens of Miaoli. Huang Zhengyu 黃正羽 expressed the shame Liu Cheng-hung caused him and other inhabitants of Miaoli:
When I see the King of Miaoli [Liu Cheng-hung], I don't dare say that's where I come from. As they say, it's the choice of the Miaoli electorate. We have to accept all their choices. In any case, on the day of the elections, everyone will swallow their tears and vote for the shadow state party [KMT] . This is Taiwan EJ4. (54) What does this prophetic fatalism mean, and on what implicit argument is it based? Does it amount to recognition of the importance of the role of the local factions in Miaoli, the majority of whose electoral candidates are affiliated with the KMT? (55) The construction of a horizon of expectation at the heart of a crisis of representative democracy
In this context, qualified by Frank Muyard as "political autism," (56) internet users, who are not simply critical spectators of a negative policy, are participating in a reflexive dynamic of wrongs that they heap upon the local leaders. The comments open up a horizon of expectation resulting in a process, initiated by internet users, of giving meaning to the polemical events linked to three tulou construction projects. To create this prospective horizon, the internet users offer alternative solutions to the bad management of budgetary expenditure. For internet user Jeffrey Bai, the sum invested in the building of the Hsinchu tulou could have been used to finance the army for several years. (57) In another commentary dated 17 July 2015, Frank Tien exclaims:
It's not enough that the neighbouring district already has one great "earthen" white elephant, but they have to go and build another "earth" building! Is it part of Zhudong's history? If there really is land available for building and a budget, why not build some social facilities for the people of the district? (58) Many internet users were demanding more effective management of local expenditure. Moreover, they sought the application of fairer policies founded on a consensus between elected officials and the populace that contributed to the common good. Internet user Lai Mengling 賴孟玲, young and with a higher education diploma, advised the government to "give the inhabitants of Taichung the future they deserve and to which they aspire" and suggested reinforcing Taiwanese soft power. (59) Internet user Gi Chang suggested using the money allotted to the Miaoli project for the protection of the historic and cultural Hakka heritage already present in Taiwan. (60) 
Conclusion
Over and above the particular nature of the events analysed, the comments seem firstly to shed light on the uncertainties inherent in representative democracy both from the point of view of identity (conflicts in the collective memory and recognition of pluralism in the formation of a national identity) and in its procedural mechanisms (representativeness of the policies and whether the elected officials are competent to govern). Most of the comments question the quality of this representativeness and at the same time, its legitimacy. These fundamental problems are discussed through a certain number of issues such as the dual identity of the Hakkas of China and the Hakkas of Taiwan, the right to self-determination of national identity, the corruption of local elected officials, and the disfunctions of the electoral system at local level. Against this background of democratic uncertainty, the virtual sphere, a public arena where individual opinions are debated and where "social worlds" (61) confront each other, affords communities the opportunity to participate in the formation and strengthening of a common framework through which to understand the event under scrutiny.
Through this reflexive, collective undertaking, the event is not only seen as a unique occurrence or as the epiphanic symptom of the social machine; the controversies brought to life by the comments of internet users also reveal the existence of value conflicts between several players attempting to influence the direction of the current process of reform. 
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